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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite being married to a U.S. citizen, non-citizen transgender
1
 
individuals and non-citizen spouses married to transgender (trans) U.S. 
citizens still face deportation today due to current immigration policies. 
One such example was Ady Oren and her husband, Jack Keegan.
2
 Jack, 
born female, never had reconstructive surgery—which courts generally 
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 1. This Comment uses the term “transgender” or “trans” in light of the evolving definition 
adopted by many scholars and advocates more versed in the area than myself. See, e.g., Paisley 
Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legisla-
tive Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 37 n.1 (2000) (using the 
term transgender or trans “in its most inclusive sense, as an umbrella term encompassing: pre-
operative, post-operative[,] and non-operative transsexual people; cross-dressers, feminine men[,] 
and masculine women; intersexed persons; and more generally, anyone whose gender identity or 
expression differs from conventional expectations of masculinity or femininity”); see also Trans 
101, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://srlp.org/resources/trans-101/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013) 
(using the term to broadly refer to individuals “whose gender identity and/or expression that does not 
or is perceived to not match stereotypical gender norms associated with our assigned gender at 
birth”). 
 2. Oren, 2006 WL 448282 (BIA 2006). 
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use as an indicator when deciding whether to grant the petition for visas.
3
 
The court reviewing the petition reversed his case to allow Jack an op-
portunity to submit evidence that his birth state recognized his changed 
gender.
4
 Luckily, he was able to obtain medical documentation stating 
that his transition was complete (and at least in Michigan, that standard 
was enough) so his petition was granted.
5
 But many trans individuals are 
not so lucky and cannot afford the requisite medical documentation that 
would allow them to stay in this country. 
When forced to return to their home countries, trans individuals are 
likely to encounter violence from those who perpetuate hate towards 
transgender and gender non-conforming individuals.
6
 Instead of protect-
ing these individuals and preserving the immigrants’ marriages, the Unit-
ed States continues to send people back to their native countries solely 
because those individuals do not fall within the narrowly constructed 
definition of marriage some states use that is legally recognized by fed-
eral courts.
7
 Trans individuals receive disparate treatment as a direct re-
sult of this discrepancy among states and their respective definitions of 
marriage. This Comment argues that such inconsistent treatment is unfair 
and, more importantly, unconstitutional. 
Current legal trends suggest that this kind of disparate treatment 
toward trans individuals should not happen. Although the United States 
has a history of refusing to recognize trans marriages as lawful, that trend 
appears to be dying today. In 2004, the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (CIS) Director for Operations issued a memoran-
dum instructing CIS personnel not to recognize the validity of any mar-
riage or intended marriage between individuals where one or both parties 
claim to be a transsexual.
8
 But shifting away from that exclusive ap-
proach, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made progress in 2005 
                                                         
 3. See Victoria Neilson, Immigration Law and the Transgender Client, 4 J. RACE GENDER & 
ETHNICITY 6, 9 (2009). 
 4. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748 (BIA 2005); Nielson, supra note 3.  
 5. Neilson, supra note 3, at 9. 
 6. Johanes Rosello, Transgender Immigrant Fears for Her Life If Deported, NEW AM. MEDIA 
(Elena Shore trans., Nov. 2, 2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/11/transgender-immigrant-
fears-for-her-life-if-deported.php. 
 7. See Rachel Tiven, On Valentine’s Day, Binational Gay and Lesbian Couples Struggle to 
Stay Together, IMMIGR. EQUALITY (Feb. 12, 2009), http://immigrationequality.org/2009/02/on-
valentine%E2%80%99s-day-binational-gay-and-lesbian-couples-struggle-to-stay-together/. 
 8. Interoffice Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. for Operations, U.S. Citizen-
ship & Immigration Servs., to Reg’l Dirs., Serv. Ctr. Dirs., Dist. Dirs., and Dir. of Office of Int’l 
Affairs (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82784.pdf 
(deeming this action to be consistent with DOMA and existing CIS policy). 
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when it issued the precedential decision In re Lovo-Lara.9 The Lovo-
Lara decision changed the guidelines that CIS officers use, leading them 
to recognize trans marriages when considering whether to grant an im-
migrant visa, legal permanent residence, or green card for eligible appli-
cants.
10
 
Moreover, in February 2011, President Obama directed the Attor-
ney General’s office to no longer defend the constitutionality of the De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a statute that allowed the federal and 
state governments to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages.
11
 Addition-
ally, recent Supreme Court decisions published on June 26, 2013, also 
paved the way for recognition of all marriages, regardless of sexuality.
12
 
As a whole, these decisions illustrate that it is unjust for only some non-
citizen applicants who are able to meet stringent state requirements, if 
any are even offered, to receive immigration benefits. 
The Lovo-Lara decision remains important in immigration law be-
cause, although the Supreme Court struck down DOMA in United States 
v. Windsor, the Court left the decision of whether to legalize same-sex 
marriages to the states.
13
 Thus, it is still important to understand the 
Lovo-Lara court’s reasoning, and its direct and indirect implications on 
certain applicants. In its decision, the Lovo-Lara court cited three main 
reasons why it determined that a postoperative transsexual’s marriage to 
                                                         
 9. See generally Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746. 
 10. As a response to Lovo-Lara, the CIS director issued new memoranda in 2009 and 2012 
stating new procedures for recognizing trans marriages. See Interoffice Memorandum from Carlos 
Iturregui, Chief, Office of Policy & Strategy, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Citizenship & Immigra-
tion Servs., to Field Leadership, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. 3–4 
(Jan. 14, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws%20and%20Regulations/Memo 
randa/Petitions_Transsexual.pdf (agreeing to issue documents reflecting an individual’s preferred 
gender if the applicant presents the required documentation); Policy Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. on Adjudication of Immigration Benefits for 
Transgender Individuals; Addition of Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) Subchapter 10.22 and 
Revisions to AFM Subchapter 21.3 (AFM Update AD12–02) (Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 CIS 
Memo], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Feedback%20Oppor 
tunities/Interim%20Guidance%20for%20Comment/Transgender_FINAL.pdf. 
 11. See Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, DOJ Should Stop Defending in Court, HUFFINGTON 
POST, http://huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/obama-doma-unconstitutional_n_827134.html (last 
updated May 25, 2011, 7:35 PM). 
 12. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2013); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
 13. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691. In fact, although written eight years prior to the Windsor 
decision, the Lovo-Lara court came to almost the same conclusion as the Supreme Court when de-
termining the scope of the federal government’s ability to regulate marriage. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. 
at 751 (“While we recognize, of course, that the ultimate issue of the validity of a marriage for im-
migration purposes is one of Federal law, that law has, from the inception of our nation, recognized 
that the regulation of marriage is almost exclusively a State matter.”). 
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her partner could be legally recognized under federal law—thereby cir-
cumventing the then-existing DOMA.
14
 First, the court noted that 
DOMA did not define the word “spouse” in terms of the sex of the par-
ties.
15
 Second, DOMA did not directly address the issue of how to define 
the sex of a postoperative transsexual or the effect on that individual’s 
subsequent marriage.
16
 Third, despite existing case law that raised that 
question at the time of DOMA’s enactment, DOMA only focused on 
preventing same-sex marriage.
17
 Based on those three reasons, the Lovo-
Lara court created the following two-part inquiry to determine if the 
marriage is valid for immigration purposes:
18
 First, has the trans individ-
ual changed his or her gender in a way that is legally recognized by the 
government?
19
  Second, does the state in which the couple resides recog-
nize such a marriage?
20
 If both questions are answered in the affirmative, 
the Lovo-Lara court determined, the parties may be lawfully recognized 
as an opposite-sex couple, thereby fulfilling DOMA’s section three re-
quirements.
21
 But this test highlights the discrepancies that exist in how 
immigration applicants are treated when a couple with a trans partner 
                                                         
 14. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. at 748–51 (holding that DOMA does not preclude trans marriages 
involving a postoperative transsexual where the state considers it a lawful opposite sex marriage). 
 15. Id. at 748. 
 16. Id. at 749. 
 17. Id. at 751. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. Most states require postoperative transsexual surgery for legal recognition, like in Lovo-
Lara. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-19(d) (2004) (“Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a 
court . . . indicating that the sex of an individual born in this state has been changed by surgical 
procedure and that the name of the individual has been changed . . . .”); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 103425(a) (2012) (“Whenever a person has undergone clinically appropriate treat-
ment . . . the person may file a petition with the superior court in any county . . . .”); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2004) (“A new certificate of birth shall be made by the State Registrar 
when: . . . (4) A written request from an individual is received by the State Registrar to change the 
sex on that individual’s birth record because of sex reassignment surgery. . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 432.235(4) (2005) (using similar language to Alabama and many other states’ statutes, requiring 
evidence “indicating that the sex of an individual born in this state has been changed by surgical 
procedure” and a legal name change). For a complete list of states’ requirements, see Sources of 
Authority to Amend Sex Designation on Birth Certificates, LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://lambdalegal.org/publications/sources-of-authority-to-amend [hereinafter Sources of Authority]. 
 20. Although many states will authorize a new birth certificate reflecting the proper sex after 
an individual has undergone a transsexual surgery, some states still do not—in effect, leaving trans 
applicants and applicants with a trans spouse with absolutely no opportunity for recourse in those 
states under the Lovo-Lara decision. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE § 16.02.08.201 (2006); OHIO REV. 
CODE § 3705.15 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (2006); see also Sources of Authority, 
supra note 19. 
 21. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. at 751. 
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applies for an immigrant visa—the couple’s future may vary depending 
on how their resident state interprets “sex.”22 
The problem, then, is what to make of this precedential ruling. On 
one hand, the decision does recognize the legal validity of trans marriag-
es if one member has undergone sexual reassignment surgery.
23
 Howev-
er, the requirement imposed by the BIA—that the trans individual under-
go surgical procedures to change his or her sex
24—places a burden on the 
large number of trans individuals who are not capable of meeting this 
requirement, based on factors such as the individual’s inability to pay for 
such a procedure or unwillingness to conform to a court-mandated stand-
ard.
25
 Although the decision was quite progressive in light of the then-
existing DOMA, the Lovo-Lara decision applied the medical model of 
trans-sexualism
26
 to further exclude non-conforming trans individuals 
from opportunities, such as immigration visas. 
Differentiating between individuals who have or have not under-
gone surgical procedures to alter their identity is an arbitrary and mean-
ingless line in the sand. All trans marriages should be recognized due to 
the protections afforded by the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.27 
Not doing so discriminates against those who cannot, or will not, have 
surgery in order to conform to society’s accepted standards of male and 
female. 
Today, because society has advanced its understanding of sexual 
and gender identity, communities increasingly seek to treat all similarly 
situated individuals alike, including ensuring that trans individuals re-
ceive same and equal treatment.
28
 Based on the reasoning found in the 
Windsor and Lovo-Lara decisions,29 the CIS wrongly withholds immi-
gration privileges to some trans individuals because of state adopted 
gender conformity distinctions. This Comment asserts that the BIA 
should change its requirements to better reflect the trend of U.S. courts 
and legislatures towards recognizing marriages among all genders.
30
 The 
                                                         
 22. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 23. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 753. 
 24. See id. 
 25. For a more detailed discussion of the difficulties faced by trans individuals in our society, 
see Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered: Struggling for Gender Self-Determination in a Hostile 
Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon Price Minter 
eds., 2006). 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 29. See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675; Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746. 
 30. See supra text accompanying notes 9–11. 
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current Lovo-Lara requirements apply unequally amongst couples with a 
trans partner and thus should not be upheld. Part II of this Comment pro-
vides background for the issue by discussing the medical model—which 
has largely defined transgender in society—juxtaposed with the concept 
of self-identity. These two models are important because they provide 
the backdrop for how trans individuals are treated in the law and in so-
ciety, and how trans individuals should ideally be treated. Part III cri-
tiques arguments surrounding gender identification and notes why such 
strict classifications should be irrelevant. Part III also evaluates the ineq-
uities and inconsistencies that stem from the Lovo-Lara decision; the 
equal protections afforded by our Constitution; and the recent court of 
appeals trend that has deemed DOMA unconstitutional altogether.
31
 Part 
IV proposes how to treat trans marriages involving immigrants and how 
those individuals will be afforded equal opportunities and protections. 
Part V briefly concludes. 
II. IDENTIFYING TRANSGENDER: THE MEDICAL MODELS VS.                   
THE SELF-IDENTITY MODEL 
Traditionally, courts understood gender using the biological mod-
el—setting strict biological definitions of male and female.32 The biolog-
ical model presumes that there are only two biological categories “and 
that the social and cultural attributes associated with gender are the natu-
ral result of a person’s biological sex.”33 Anyone who did not strictly 
adhere to this system was considered “unnatural” and deemed “unworthy 
of legal protection.”34 Within the past few decades, however, courts have 
started to emphasize the medical model—a model that evolved from the 
biological model.
35
 Its emphasis on gender identity as a medical condi-
tion differs from that of the self-identity concept, another recently devel-
oped model, which does not place individuals in the strict, traditional 
gender categories.
36
 These next two sections further explain the differ-
ences between the medical and self-identity models, and discuss how the 
varying approaches tend to produce different results in how trans indi-
viduals are treated, especially within the purview of immigration law. 
                                                         
 31. See generally Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 32. See Franklin Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of 
Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 719 (2005). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 719–20. 
 35. Id. at 724. 
 36. Id. at 724–25, 738–39. 
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A. The Medical Model: Viewing Transgender As a Disease 
The transgender medical model maintains that gender nonconformi-
ty is a psychological condition, which requires medical treatment or ser-
vices.
37
 The medical model uses the psychiatric diagnosis of Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID) to explain gender nonconformity.
38
 It is prem-
ised “upon the belief that some people suffer from a psychological condi-
tion (GID) that causes them to experience great discomfort regarding 
their assigned gender.”39 The medical model assumes that only two gen-
ders exist and perpetuates the norms typically associated with these two 
genders throughout society.
40
 For example, from the early years of child-
hood, girls are taught to play with dolls or fake kitchen sets; boys are 
encouraged to build models and pretend to be cowboys or soldiers. In 
effect, the model creates a rigid gender paradigm to classify people as 
women or men, originating at birth.
41
 
Moreover, the rigid classification system created by the medical 
model has a particularly harsh effect on lower income trans individuals.
42
 
Because the medical model focuses on treating trans individuals as “suf-
fering” from a disease, it perpetuates the belief that trans individuals 
should be treated as this “other” group.43 As a result, many trans individ-
uals are more likely to live in poverty and suffer from lower quality of 
life because they tend to face systemic discrimination from society.
44
 
Poverty makes it difficult to access adequate legal and medical care, in-
advertently affecting an immigrant’s ability to survive the Lovo-Lara 
inquiry (and have his or her visa petition granted). 
However, as a way to work within this medical model, some states 
will recognize the preferred gender identity of a trans person by reissuing 
a birth certificate for that individual, thereby ensuring a fit within the 
medical model’s two-gender dichotomy while meeting the Lovo-Lara 
                                                         
 37. Jonathan L. Koenig, Note, Distributive Consequences of the Medical Model, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 619 (2011); Romeo, supra note 32, at 725. 
 38. Romeo, supra note 32, at 724–25 & n.45. 
 39. Id. at 725. 
 40. See id. at 724–25. 
 41. Id. at 724. 
 42. Id. at 722 (noting that low-income trans people do not tend to “occupy positions of privi-
lege in society; therefore, low-income people and people of color are more likely to encounter sys-
tems and institutions which subject them to strict gender requirements”); see also Spade, supra note 
25, at 221 (“Access to participation in the U.S. economy has always been conditioned on the ability 
of each individual to comply with norms of gendered behavior and expression, and the U.S. econo-
my has always been shaped by explicit incentives that coerce people into normative gender and 
sexual structures, identities, and behaviors.”). 
 43. See Romeo, supra note 32, at 729. 
 44. Id. at 723. 
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standard. Still, even in states that reissue birth certificates, there are many 
barriers one must overcome to obtain a new birth certificate. Trans-
applicants must present extensive medical and psychological evidence 
demonstrating that they meet certain qualifications of their identified 
gender.
45
 Courts that recognize the gender identity of trans litigants also 
inquire into such intimate and personal details that any reasonable liti-
gant would neither want nor expect the court to scrutinize.
46
 For instance, 
the court in M.T. v. J.T. raised the plaintiff’s ability (a trans woman) to 
engage in heterosexual intercourse as a female, noting in particular her 
vagina’s “good cosmetic appearance” to determine that the woman was 
legally female for the purposes of her marriage.
47
 By egregiously dissect-
ing intimate details about an individual’s medical changes to determine 
gender identity, courts further repress and de-humanize the large majori-
ty of trans individuals who cannot afford or have no interest in such sur-
gery.
 48
 Moreover, it is likely that the invasive requests for extensive and 
intimate details would deter a trans person from applying or being suc-
cessful in his or her application. The self-identity model, on the other 
hand, asks why an individual has to apply in the first place to be legally 
recognized as his or her preferred gender. 
B. The Self-Identity Model: Allowing for Non-Conformity 
In contrast to the medical model, the self-identity, or self-
determination model,
49
 helps alleviate the problems discussed above by 
disregarding the strict two-gender classification model. Legal scholar 
Franklin Romeo defined the self-determination model as one that “rec-
ognizes gender as a fundamental aspect of human life, which every per-
son has the capacity and inherent right to control.”50 As a country that 
notably preserves an individual’s liberty in so many aspects of life, this 
model seems obviously appealing. As opposed to relying on society’s 
preferred gender constructs, the self-identity model disregards the prede-
                                                         
 45. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2004) (allowing the State Registrar to grant a 
new birth certificate to an individual when “[a] written request from an individual is received by the 
State Registrar to change the sex on that individual’s birth record because of sex reassignment sur-
gery, if the request is accompanied by a notarized statement from the physician who performed the 
sex reassignment surgery or from a physician licensed to practice medicine who has examined the 
individual and can certify that the person has undergone sex reassignment surgery”). 
 46. Romeo, supra note 32, at 726–27; see also M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1976); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 47. M.T., 355 A.2d at 206. 
 48. See Romeo, supra note 32, at 734–35. 
 49. Id. at 739. 
 50. Id. at 738–39. 
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termined construct and moves towards an approach that allows individu-
als to define themselves in a way that accurately reflects their gender.
51
 
As a result, all similarly situated individuals would be subject to the 
same freedoms and limitations, rendering arbitrary differences in gender 
identity as superfluous. For instance, when trans individuals apply for 
U.S. immigrant visas based on their marriage status, the self-
determination model would recognize all opposite-sex marriages (ful-
filling DOMA’s requirements) so long as one of the parties identified as 
the opposite sex. In effect, applying this model would grant all married 
trans couples the same benefits instead of creating an arbitrary line be-
tween certain married couples receiving benefits and some couples being 
denied those same benefits. 
III. GENDER IDENTIFICATION: WHY MUST SOCIETY CLASSIFY 
INDIVIDUALS AS “NORMAL” OR AN “OTHER”? 
Gender identification in the law puts individuals into restrictive cat-
egories based on society’s perceptions of male and female norms. This 
section questions why our society still clings to this approach despite the 
disparate impact that it has on certain individuals who do not fit perfectly 
within these categories. First, this section explains how the same-sex 
marriage issue and the recent destruction of DOMA should lead to the 
recognition of all qualified couples,
52
 regardless of gender identity. Sec-
ond, this section analyzes why the Lovo-Lara decision fails to adequately 
recognize and protect the rights of trans individuals. By broadly recog-
nizing marriage regardless of gender, trans individuals will not need to 
meet the expensive and demanding barriers that the immigration courts 
currently impose. 
A. The Gay Marriage Battle: The Slow Deterioration of DOMA           
and Opposite-Sex Classifications for Marriage and Its Implications 
Over the past few years, courts have slowly begun to reject DOMA 
as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
53
 Furthermore, the 
                                                         
 51. See Gabriel Arkles, Pooja Gehi & Elana Redfield, The Role of Lawyers in Trans Libera-
tion: Building a Transformative Movement for Social Change, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 579, 591 
(2010). 
 52. “Qualified couples” is used to mean those persons that are otherwise recognized by states, 
such as the requirement most states use that parties must be eighteen years old (unless permitted by 
limited exceptions). See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 302 (West 2012). 
 53. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307) (holding section 3 of DOMA subject to 
intermediate scrutiny and deciding the statute violates equal protection and is therefore unconstitu-
tional); see also Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (denying a stay for 
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Obama Administration’s direction to no longer defend the constitutional-
ity of DOMA in 2011
54
 may have paved the way for the Windsor deci-
sion decided in June 2013, which abolished DOMA under federal law.
55
 
This section discusses the rationale behind courts’ determination that 
DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause. This section also explains 
why this rationale should apply to grant immigration benefits to trans 
couples. 
1. Equal Protection: Laying the Groundwork for the Recognition           
of All Trans Marriages 
The Equal Protection Clause was used in many cases to develop 
and support ideas of liberty and personhood.
 56
 Since the 1960s, many 
different groups have used those Supreme Court decisions to advance 
rights and freedoms. Some of those cases can also be used to demon-
strate that recognizing all marriages between trans individuals is both 
lawful and necessary.
57
 
In Lawrence v. Texas, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that Texas could not enforce a statute criminalizing sexual con-
duct between same-sex persons under the Constitution.
58
 The Court rea-
soned that the Constitution entitles U.S. citizens to certain liberties with-
out government intrusion.
59
 The decision emphasized the respect that 
individuals are entitled to in their private lives and the ability to freely 
define their own concepts of personhood.
60
 
Additionally, the Court determined that the former Bowers deci-
sion
61
 had become antiquated, noting that the states’ trend had been to 
                                                                                                                              
California’s Proposition 8 on the basis that an injunction against enforcement of Proposition 8 is in 
the public’s best interest); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) (hold-
ing DOMA unconstitutional because Section 3 violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection 
clause); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (finding that DOMA 
violates the Massachusetts Constitution). 
 54. Obama: DOMA Unconstitutional, supra note 11. 
 55. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 56. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 57. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996). 
 58. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia’s sodomy statute and de-
termining that the right to privacy does not protect homosexual acts). Significantly, the case stood 
for the proposition that the Supreme Court, and, by extension, society, did not accept homosexuals. 
See Elizabeth Sheyn, The Shot Heard Around the LGBT World: Bowers v. Hardwick As a Mobiliz-
ing Force for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, 4 J. RACE GENDER & ETHNICITY 2 (2009). 
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relax or abolish laws targeting homosexual conduct since Bowers was 
decided.
62
 Similarly, in this context, the states have shown a pattern of 
moving towards legally recognizing same-sex marriage.
63
 The same rea-
soning employed by Justice Anthony Kennedy in Lawrence can also be 
applied to trans individuals in this situation: the liberties afforded by the 
Constitution to define one’s own concept of personhood,64 as well as the 
emerging trend of recognizing marriage regardless of sex, demonstrate 
that trans individuals should have no barriers to receiving immigration 
benefits based on marriage, regardless of sexual identity. The challenges 
imposed by the Lovo-Lara decision only impede certain trans individuals 
from obtaining the same benefits enjoyed by either non-trans or trans 
individuals with the means and opportunity to satisfy the Lovo-Lara re-
quirements.
65
 Such disparate impact is not equal treatment, and there is 
no rationale that supports such an unfair and unequal result. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans also provides 
guidance on this matter.
66
 The Romer court determined that the amend-
ment to Colorado’s state constitution (Amendment 2) overtly discrimi-
nated against homosexuals and prevented those individuals from the 
same protections afforded to heterosexuals.
67
 The Court recognized: 
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitu-
tion’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government 
and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek 
its assistance. ‘Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through 
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.’
68
 
Moreover, the Court determined that Amendment 2 was impermis-
sible because it blatantly denied equal protection to homosexuals only 
and had no identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.
69
 In-
stead, it only sought to further society’s moral condemnation of homo-
sexual conduct.
70
 It is evident that the same sort of discrimination is cur-
rently occurring in this post-Lovo-Lara era. The Lovo-Lara decision fur-
                                                         
 62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573. 
 63. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 701 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE 26.04.010 (2012); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-21 (2009); VERMONT STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2009). 
 64. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. 
 65. See Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 749–51 (BIA 2005). 
 66. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1999). 
 67. See id. at 624 (noting that Colorado’s Amendment 2 had the effect of repealing municipal 
ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
tion, conduct, practices or relationships”). 
 68. Id. at 633 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)). 
 69. Id. at 635. 
 70. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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thers the dominant and oppressive view that marriage should be between 
a man and a woman because it only recognizes opposite-sex marriages 
limited to post-operative trans individuals.
71
 
By requiring only trans individuals to conform their gender to an 
identity accepted by the majority of society, it forces society’s idea of the 
appropriate makeup of an opposite-sex marriage onto non-conforming 
individuals. Those who do not conform cannot reap the same benefits as 
those who do. This discrimination raises the question: how can the dis-
parate treatment by states be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence in cases like Romer and Lawrence,72 which suggest that all 
trans individuals should receive equal treatment given the liberties and 
protections that the Constitution affords its citizens under the Fourteenth 
Amendment? 
2. Court Decisions Today Demonstrate That Gay Marriage—and         
Trans Marriage—Must Be Lawful 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health stands as the first case 
for a court to find DOMA unconstitutional.
73
 The Goodridge court held 
that DOMA was unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution 
because of the vast protections and benefits civil marriage provides to 
couples, and due to the inadequate reasons that Massachusetts offered to 
deny civil marriage.
74
 The Goodridge court noted that civil marriage is 
central to the way that the Massachusetts Commonwealth operates by 
creating civilized rules regarding property, medical care, and child cus-
tody, amongst other benefits.
75
 Interestingly, the court noted that similar 
Equal Protection Clause arguments—that the right at stake was funda-
mental—had been used decades ago to overturn anti-miscegenation laws, 
demonstrating the importance of the right to choose to marry.
76
 When 
                                                         
 71. The “one man” and “one woman” idea is further limited by what society considers ac-
ceptable under the medically influenced definitions discussed in supra Part II. 
 72. These two cases demonstrate that laws must have a legitimate purpose—determining that 
discriminating against homosexuals is not legitimate—and that individual liberty provides U.S. 
citizens with much freedom to decide how to conduct their personal lives relating to privileges such 
as marriage. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559–60 (2003). 
 73. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 74. Id. at 954. 
 75. Id. at 954–57. 
 76. Id. at 958 (“As both Perez and Loving make clear, the right to marry means little if it does 
not include the right to marry the person of one’s choice, subject to appropriate government re-
strictions in the interests of public health, safety, and welfare. . . . In this case, as in Perez and Lov-
ing, a statute deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and 
social significance—the institution of marriage—because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and 
Loving, sexual orientation here. . . . [H]istory must yield to a more fully developed understanding of 
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applying the rational basis test,
77
 the court did not find any rational rela-
tionship between the disqualification of same-sex couples from civil 
marriage and the state’s proffered justifications of the protection of pub-
lic health, safety, or general welfare.
78
 
As the Goodridge court makes clear, marriage today is a civil right, 
and due to the “legal, financial[,] and social benefits” that it affords to 
those who are able to choose to marry,
79
 DOMA unfairly denies such 
advantages to a portion of the community for no rational reason.
80
 Addi-
tionally, in Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, the court employed 
similar reasoning—also using rational basis review to analyze the Equal 
Protection Clause arguments—to conclude that DOMA was unconstitu-
tional because it denied federal benefits to citizens.
81
 Importantly, the 
court found that DOMA could not pass constitutional muster due to its 
marriage-based classification: 
By premising eligibility for benefits on marriage, Congress has 
made the determination that married people make up a class of simi-
larly-situated individuals different in relevant respects from the 
class of non-married people. Cast in this light, the claim that the 
federal government may also have an interest in treating all same-
sex couples alike, whether married or unmarried, plainly cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
82
 
Finally, the Supreme Court decided in Windsor that “DOMA is un-
constitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by 
the Fifth Amendment [Due Process Clause] of the Constitution.”83 The 
Court analyzed the tradition and history of the states’ ability to regulate 
marriage, recognizing that the “‘regulation of domestic relations’ is ‘an 
area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the 
States.’”84 The Court concluded that, by imposing its federal definition of 
marriage, DOMA’s “principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for 
other reasons like governmental efficiency. . . . And DOMA contrives to 
                                                                                                                              
the invidious quality of the discrimination.” (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 27 (Cal. 1948); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967))). 
 77. Rational basis review is the lowest standard of review when determining the constitutional-
ity of statutes under the Equal Protection Clause. Under rational basis review, “the Equal Protection 
Clause requires only that the classification drawn by the statute be rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 432 (1985). 
 78. Goodridge, 789 N.E.2d at 968. 
 79. Id. at 948, 957. 
 80. Id. at 967–68. 
 81. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376, 387 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 82. Id. at 394–95. 
 83. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013). 
 84. Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 494 (1975)). 
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deprive some couples married under the laws of their state, but not other 
couples, of both rights and responsibilities.”85 
All of these cases held that DOMA was unconstitutional because it 
provided certain privileges and protections to some people at the exclu-
sion of others based on their marriage classification. By categorically 
denying the right to choose to marry to all same-sex couples, DOMA 
thereby violates the Equal Protection Clause as incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
86
 The impact of Lovo-Lara can be analogized in 
the same way. Although the 2005 decision sought to recognize trans mar-
riages that adequately conformed to the one woman and one man con-
fines dictated by DOMA, the court’s decision restricted recognition to 
the small percentage of trans individuals that could meet their state’s re-
quirement to get a new birth certificate after having undergone sexual 
reassignment surgery.
87
 This rule does not align with the recent same-sex 
marriage cases. 
Marriage plays an important role both as a defining moment in an 
individual’s life as well as conferring widespread governmental benefits 
on a couple. Due to its importance, it is entirely unreasonable to allow 
some trans individuals to obtain these privileges while others are denied 
those same benefits. The enactment of DOMA was “rooted in persistent 
prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to be) homosex-
ual.” 88  That prejudice and the burden imposed by DOMA no longer 
stands.
89
 Yet the Lovo-Lara decision similarly disqualifies classes of per-
sons from marriage because they do not fit within the state-approved def-
inition of marriage—which only perpetuates those prejudices described 
by the Goodridge court. Equal protection laws require those biases to be 
held unconstitutional, and as such, marriage should not establish re-
quirements regarding the parties’ genders. Just as same-sex couples 
should be allowed to legally marry, so too should trans couples. 
Enacting statutes that define marriage as an act between two per-
sons,
90
 and not specifying any gender, will permit all trans couples to 
marry regardless of any unnecessary court burden. The line that separates 
trans couples that meet the Lova-Lara requirements from those that do 
not is needless. This distinction only reflects the tired opinion of the ma-
jority of society—or arguably, not even the majority, but rather the more 
                                                         
 85. Id. at 2694. 
 86. See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 394–95; see also Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d 941, 967–69 (Mass. 2003). 
 87. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 748–49 (BIA 2005). 
 88. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968. 
 89. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695. 
 90. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(1) (2012). 
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boisterous—that sex (and consequently marriage) should be confined to 
that between a man and a woman. Courts have yet to explain why gender 
reassignment surgery is the appropriate boundary for trans marriage 
recognition in the immigration context, and it is unlikely that any at-
tempted explanation would be adequate regardless. 
B. Lovo-Lara Is Insufficient in Recognizing Trans Marriages               
Predicated on the Fight for Gay Marriage 
1. The Impact of Lovo-Lara on Trans Immigrants 
At first glance, the Lovo-Lara decision was a breakthrough for trans 
couples and transgender rights because it recognized certain trans mar-
riages in the immigration context.
91
 This Comment does not aim to di-
minish the fact that the court found a way to accept visa petitions by 
trans immigrants and immigrants with a trans partner who is a U.S. citi-
zen, so long as one of the parties met the necessary conditions that their 
birth state required to obtain a new birth certificate.
92
 Furthermore, in 
light of the strict definition of marriage required by then-existing 
DOMA, Lovo-Lara’s legal recognition of trans marriages can be consid-
ered an accomplishment for the trans equality movement; it meant that 
those couples were afforded the same benefits and protections as those of 
non-trans married couples. 
The Lovo-Lara decision also impacted the way that the CIS treated 
the visa process for trans couples’ applications. In response to the BIA’s 
Lovo-Lara decision, the CIS’s Associate Director issued new interoffice 
memoranda in both 2009 and 2012 to implement new CIS procedures for 
recognizing trans marriages.
93
 Under the CIS’s 2012 policy, the organi-
zation will issue a document reflecting an individual’s preferred gender if 
the individual presents (1) an amended birth certificate, passport, or court 
order reflecting the new gender; or (2) medical certification of the 
change in gender from a licensed physician or doctor of osteopathy.
94
 In 
addition to the lengthy medical certification required under subsection 
two,
95
 the applicant may also be asked to submit to the CIS acceptable 
                                                         
 91. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746. 
 92. See id. at 751. 
 93. See 2012 CIS Memo, supra note 10. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. Id. For the medical certification, the licensed physician is required to include language 
stating that the individual “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” and that the 
licensed physician “has either treated the applicant in relation to the applicant’s change in gender or 
has reviewed and evaluated the medical history of the applicant in relation to the applicant’s change 
in gender and that he/she has a doctor/patient relationship with the applicant.” Id. (emphasis in orig-
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evidence of identity in the new gender, including a recent facial photo-
graph.
96
 
Presumably, this picture will be used to judge the candidate’s like-
ness to his or her identified gender, which presents several problems. 
First, there is no need to submit a photograph as proof of gender beyond 
making the process more difficult for trans applicants—as encompassed 
by the self-determination model, such photographic proof is unnecessary 
because the individual’s choice determines his or her gender. Second, the 
CIS officers should not have the authority or discretion to dictate wheth-
er a person will be recognized as his or her preferred gender based strict-
ly on medical proof and physical likeness. The implications of the CIS 
officer’s decision may ultimately affect whether the applicant’s visa will 
be granted or denied by the CIS.
97
 Although it is appalling that the CIS 
can inquire into such personal and sensitive matters without question, 
applicants readily comply to become a U.S. legal permanent resident be-
cause they have no other options. 
Another problem associated with both the Lovo-Lara decision and 
the subsequent CIS memorandum is that both require extensive medical 
proof to recognize an individual in his or her new gender for legal pur-
poses unless a reissued birth certificate is produced.
98
 Aside from the 
humiliation likely suffered by having to submit such intimate and some-
times embarrassing
99
 documentation, the process is also undoubtedly 
costly and time-consuming for the trans individual, requiring resources 
that the individual may not have.
100
 In regard to the extensive medical 
procedures required, those individuals who cannot access the sexual re-
assignment surgery or appropriate clinical treatment
101—for whatever 
reasons, cost, personal choice, or otherwise—will be largely ineligible 
for the benefits granted to those who do have the surgery. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                              
inal). However, the memorandum fails to define “appropriate clinical treatment,” and the CIS rules 
do not require proof of sex reassignment surgery to issue the requested document. See id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See id. at 2. 
 98. See Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746 (BIA 2005); see also 2012 CIS Memo, supra note 10, 
at 3. 
 99. Embarrassing is used only in the sense that it would be embarrassing for an individual to 
have certain—otherwise private—medical records shared with and scrutinized by strangers. 
 100. The cost of sex reassignment surgery alone can cost upwards of $20,000, without includ-
ing the ongoing cost of hormonal therapy and risks associated with the surgery. Susan Brink, Imag-
ining Chelsea Manning: The Science of Sex Changes, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/08/130822-bradley-manning-chelsea-sex-change-
hormone-therapy/. 
 101. See 2012 CIS Memo, supra note 10, at 3. 
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outcome favors more privileged transgender people and furthers the 
preexisting class divide in society.
102
 
Moreover, as research indicates, this exclusion tends to affect a 
large portion of the trans community because of the “cycle of poverty” 
described by the Sylvia Rivera Law Project (SRLP).
103
 Pooja Gehi de-
scribes that the cycle of poverty stems from the “systematic discrimina-
tion and marginalization that trans people are likely to face throughout 
their lives” for not conforming to the normal gender roles society as-
signs.
104
 Due to this poverty cycle, most trans individuals are vulnerable 
and disadvantaged compared to the rest of society.
105
 These disad-
vantages make it more difficult for trans individuals to access basic 
commodities such as education, employment, and healthcare.
106
 When 
the court imposed the gender reassignment standard, it prevented the ma-
jority of these individuals from receiving the benefits thought to be con-
ferred in the Lovo-Lara decisions. 
Furthermore, when courts require sexual reassignment surgery, they 
reinforce the transgender medical model by indicating that gender identi-
ty can only be recognized in conformance with medical definitions. And 
courts have consistently defined transgender using mechanical, restric-
tive medical language that does not allow for an individual to determine 
his or her own identity.
107
 In effect, courts carry the power of construing 
what is acceptable in terms of recognizing marriages involving a trans 
spouse. 
The poverty cycle further affects a trans individual’s ability to 
change the status quo. The small minority of trans individuals that can 
afford a sexual reassignment surgery
108
 will be rewarded with citizenship 
and likely will not question the status quo or challenge the CIS’s applica-
                                                         
 102. See Arkles, Gehi & Redfield, supra note 51, at 591. 
 103. Flowchart: Poverty & Homelessness, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://srlp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/disproportionate_poverty_1.pdf [hereinafter Flowchart]; see also Pooja 
Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on Low-Income 
Transgender People of Color, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 324 (2009). 
 104. Gehi, supra note 103, at 324. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Flowchart, supra note 103. 
 107. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 308 (Ill. App. 2005). In Simmons, 
the court refused to recognize the petitioner as a male despite his male physical appearance because 
of his “clear, normal female external genitalia and breast tissue.” Id. One expert witness testified that 
the petitioner was still a female after enduring a hysterectomy and oophorectomy because those 
surgeries were not intended to be part of the sex reassignment process. This expert also indicated 
that the petitioner would need “a vaginectomy, reduction mammoplasty, metoidoiplasty, scrotoplas-
ty, urethroplasty, and phalloplasty” before he could be considered completely sexually reassigned. 
Id. at 309.  
 108. Flowchart, supra note 103. 
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tion requirements because they already received their legal status. Those 
who cannot afford the requisite medical changes will not be offered le-
gal, permanent residence; nor do those individuals have the means to 
lobby to change those standards required by the CIS applications in the 
first place. Thus, the CIS can legally require such proof and force appli-
cants to provide such documentation without anyone questioning the sys-
tem. 
In part, because access to reassignment surgery is so limited, the 
CIS and the immigration courts must not treat those that choose not to 
pursue this course differently. However, by implementing the Lovo-Lara 
requirements, the CIS and the BIA routinely force individuals to change 
their identity to one that is more socially acceptable. As a result, these 
organizations will not offer individuals who cannot afford or do not want 
to undergo the requirements of Lovo-Lara the benefits received by those 
who do conform to mandated gender roles. By imposing these stringent 
standards, states and the federal government deny rights to trans individ-
uals in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.
109
 In effect, only some trans couples obtain benefits because of 
these qualifications as to what is legally recognized as the opposite sex or 
because the state in which the couple resides recognizes same-sex mar-
riage. These similar gender identity problems do not exist for those indi-
viduals who identify as the gender they are assigned at birth, given socie-
ty’s predetermined gender norms. 
2. Applying the Equal Protection Cases to Trans Rights 
Although gender based classifications are reviewed under interme-
diate scrutiny,
110
 the precise issue of gender identity classification has not 
explicitly been raised before the Court.
111
 The next section analyzes the 
classification under both intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review 
to exemplify that, under either method of review, the disparate treatment 
                                                         
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 110. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996). Intermediate scrutiny requires 
an important government interest and substantial connection between the problem and the solution. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976). 
 111. The United States v. Windsor decision sheds the most light on this matter. In its opinion, 
the Court noted President Obama’s conclusion that “heightened equal protection scrutiny should 
apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation.” 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683–84 (2013). The 
Court also noted that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied the heightened scrutiny 
standard. Id. at 2684. While not expressly adopting the heightened equal protection scrutiny, the 
Court did not expressly reject the standard either. See generally id. 
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of trans individuals created by the Lovo-Lara decision violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
If gender identity classifications were accorded intermediate scruti-
ny review, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence illustrates that the Lovo-
Lara case would not likely pass constitutional muster. To withstand in-
termediate review, the challenged classification must serve an important 
government interest and must have a substantial connection to the 
achievement of that interest.
112
 The classification must also be distin-
guished as facially neutral or facially discriminatory.
113
 Facially discrim-
inatory classifications are those that identify the disadvantaged party in 
the text of the legislation.
114
 A facially neutral classification does not 
make a discriminatory distinction on its face, so challengers must prove 
both a disparate impact and discriminatory purpose on the affected 
group.
115
 There is a strong argument that the Lovo-Lara decision is fa-
cially discriminatory because the decision impacts only those persons 
who do not want to marry into the traditional opposite-sex marriage. For 
purposes of analysis, however, the following discussion will demonstrate 
that, even assuming the decision is facially neutral, the decision still fails 
under intermediate scrutiny review. 
In Feeney, the Court determined that a state law giving preference 
to hiring war veterans was gender-neutral because it impacted both men 
and women, even though it had a substantially discriminatory impact 
against women.
116
 Unlike in Feeney, the state marriage laws that restrict 
same-sex marriage are not gender-neutral because they impact only this 
“other” group—those who do not traditionally fit within the male or fe-
male category. Thus, those laws show a disparate impact against only 
gay and trans individuals who are prohibited from marriage unless they 
conform to traditional gender categories. 
While comparing Lovo-Lara to Feeney demonstrates that a dispar-
ate impact exists, a party must also prove discriminatory purpose by 
demonstrating that the federal government enacted or maintained a stat-
ute because of an anticipated discriminatory effect.
117
 In the instant (the-
oretical) case, litigants must prove that the state statute requiring issu-
                                                         
 112. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197–98. 
 113. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
 114. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
 115. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (stating that discriminatory 
purpose implies “that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular action at least in part 
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 116. Id. at 272. 
 117. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987). 
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ance of a new birth certificate to validly recognize that person’s marriage 
was enacted to discriminate against those with a different gender identi-
ty. This result seems clear because states originally enacted such statutes 
to ensure that only heterosexual relationships would be recognized by the 
state, and they have been largely maintained throughout the years be-
cause of society’s assumed disapproval of any relationship that does not 
conform to the “one man, one woman” standard.118 The barrier imposed 
on anyone that does not meet this moral standard is reflected in the re-
quirement that a person must undergo extensive gender reassignment 
surgery before the state will recognize his or her gender identity. 
From the discussion above, it seems clear that a Lovo-Lara chal-
lenger would easily be able to show a discriminatory impact and purpose. 
The analysis then turns to whether the classification serves an important 
governmental objective and whether the legislation is substantially relat-
ed to that objective.
119
 Even though DOMA can no longer be used to de-
ny non-citizen applicants rights, a similar impact still exists because 
Lovo-Lara is predicated on a state approach method. By allowing states 
to regulate marriage, differences still exist as to how marriage is de-
fined—thus affecting only some trans couples. 
Moreover, the definition of marriage as “between one man and one 
woman” is based on moral standards, similar to marriage restrictions 
used prior to the Civil Rights Era in an attempt to prohibit interracial 
marriages.
120
  Just as the moral condemnation of interracial marriage was 
not an important—or even legitimate—government interest,121 neither is 
this prohibition on marriage between same sex or transgender couples. 
While DOMA is substantially related to that objective, the objective is 
illegitimate.
122
 As a result, the Lovo-Lara decision should not pass con-
stitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny. 
While Lovo-Lara would fail under intermediate scrutiny, the Court 
may instead determine that gender identity only has to meet rational ba-
sis review based on the Romer v. Evans decision.123 Under rational basis 
                                                         
 118. See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 388 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Aff. 
of Gary D. Buseck, H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 
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 119. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 120. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 121. See generally id. 
 122. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 123. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (holding that sexual orientation receives ra-
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review, the Court has stated that laws are constitutional unless the gov-
ernment’s action is “clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an 
exercise of judgment.”124 Even though rational basis is a more difficult 
standard of review, challengers will still be able to meet it and prove that 
the Lovo-Lara decision is clearly wrong. Allowing trans marriages to be 
legally recognized only if one undergoes sexual reassignment surgery is 
a display of arbitrary power because it draws a meaningless distinction 
between those trans individuals who can attain reassignment surgery and 
the large majority of trans people who cannot.
125
 The requirement that 
trans marriages be recognized only after a person has medically altered 
his or her gender does not make sense and preserves the traditional, dis-
criminatory notion that gender is rigid and assigned at birth. Instead, in-
dividuals should be allowed to define themselves, in alignment with this 
country’s respect for freedom and choice.126 Why can the government 
determine how a person identifies himself or herself, deciding that those 
who receive a certain surgery can legally change their gender, while 
those who do not receive the surgery are denied the same benefits? Such 
a denial seems contradictory to the fundamental nature of the freedom to 
marry.
127
 
IV. AFFORD EQUAL PROTECTIONS TO ALL TRANS INDIVIDUALS 
With evidence demonstrating Lovo-Lara’s failure to meet the in-
termediate scrutiny and rational basis standards of review, the case today 
is an impediment towards equal rights for trans individuals. The court’s 
decision recognized only some trans marriages—where one partner had 
the means to obtain a sexual reassignment surgery and the residential 
state recognized it as legally changing one’s gender—as valid in the im-
migration context.
128
 The effect of this rule is to further marginalize the 
large majority of trans individuals who cannot achieve such a surgery,
129
 
while simultaneously acknowledging the rights of more privileged trans 
people. 
The United States supposedly stands for the equal protection of its 
citizens and against the arbitrary line drawing that excludes similarly 
                                                         
 124. Mathews v. DeCastro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
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situated individuals from the same liberties and freedoms.
130
 Thus, logi-
cally, all married trans couples that seek to obtain immigration benefits 
should be given those benefits regardless of the party’s ability to undergo 
sexual reassignment surgery or the state’s definition of marriage. That 
way, all similarly situated individuals (who are allowed the freedom to 
self-identify) will be treated equally along with all other married couples 
that are eligible for those same benefits. In order to afford equal protec-
tions to all citizens, states must adopt statutes that include broader lan-
guage,
131
 such as language used in the self-identity model. The use of 
broader language will stop denying protections to certain individuals 
who do not meet the costly, time-consuming, and demanding require-
ments currently imposed by states. 
The federal government must adopt broad language that affords 
equal access to visa benefits for all trans individuals and couples. By do-
ing so, the government will further the notions of personhood and liberty 
inherent in the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases.132 Under the ju-
risprudence of the Supreme Court, the Lovo-Lara decision cannot 
stand.
133
 The Lawrence court determined that the right to define one’s 
own concept of existence and personhood is promised by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
134
 Recognizing all trans marriages and treating all trans 
individuals equally will only further those protections afforded by the 
Constitution. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Lovo-Lara case only furthers discrimination against trans indi-
viduals by forcing them to conform with the majority view of gender 
classification or risk being deported. Trans individuals are more likely to 
face poverty and discrimination, and these obstacles prevent them from 
earning an adequate income;
135
 therefore, it is unlikely that every trans 
                                                         
 130. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (“Our obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)). 
 131. For example, under Washington State’s revised statute defining marriage, “marriage is a 
civil contract between two persons who have attained the age of eighteen years, and who are other-
wise capable.” WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 132. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (determining that liberty, promised by the Consti-
tution, entitles adults with respect for their private lives and “a right to engage in their conduct with-
out intervention of the government”). 
 133. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 134. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 135. Flowchart, supra note 103; see also Trans Immigrants Disproportionately Subject to 
Deportation and Detention, Suffer Special Gender-Related Harms in These Processes, SYLVIA 
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individual who would like to qualify as being in an opposite sex marriage 
for immigration status is able to overcome those burdens. Further, as a 
trans individual, being deported back to his or her native country could 
mean a death sentence.
136
 Recognition of all trans marriages is the only 
way to treat all trans individuals equally under the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment and in accordance with U.S. principles of freedom 
and opportunity. 
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 136. See Rosello, supra note 6. 
